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PROTECTING FEDERALISM OR ASSAULTING

SEPARATION OF POWERS?
THE PROPOSED TENTH AMENDMENT
ENFORCEMENT ACT
[B]y usurping functions traditionally performed by the
States, federal overreaching... undermines the constitutionally mandated balance ofpower between the States and
the Federal Government, a balance designed to protect our
fundamental liberties.'
I. INTRODUCTION

In response to President Clinton's Executive Order 13,0832 (BO
13,083, or the Order) and two of the Supreme Court's decisions in
1. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985)
(5-4 decision) (Powell, J., dissenting).
2. Exec. OrderNo. 13,083, 3 C.F.R 146 (1998), reprintedin 5 U.S.C.A. §
601 at 55 (1999). The Order, which has since been rescinded, staged a blatant,
fundamental assault on the federal-state relationship established in the Tenth
Amendment, and raised serious questions regarding the Clinton Administration's view of the scope of federal power. See Clinton-Gorev. State and Local
Governments: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Nat 7 Econ. Growth, Natural
Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform and
Oversight, 105th Cong. 323 (1998) [hereinafter Hearingon EO 13,083] (letter

from Malcolm Wallop, U.S. Senate-Ret, Frontiers of Freedom Institute). The
Order gave the federal government supreme power over the states and was
viewed in Washington as "threaten[ing] the authority of the United States
Congress, the sovereignty of the States, and the most basic rights of individual
citizens." Id. at 2 (prepared statement of Rep. Collins). It vastly expanded
federal authority by increasing the number of situations where federal action is
justified. See 3 C.F.R. 146 (expanding the areas where federal action is justified under § 3(d), including "[w]hen there is a need for uniform national standards" and "[w]hen States have not adequately protected individual rights and
liberties"). Moreover, it revoked both of the following: President Reagan's
1987 Executive Order, Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (1996), and President Clinton's own 1993 Executive Order, Exec. Order No. 12,875, 3 C.F.R. 669 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. §
601 (1996). Both of these orders had provided many protections for state and
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the Tenth Amendment area, Senator Paul Coverdell of Georgia introduced Senate Bill 2250, the "Tenth Amendment Enforcement Act
of 1998" (the Bill), on June 26, 1998. 3 Although the Bill never made
it out of committee during the 105th Congress, the Bill may be reintroduced in a future congressional session and is well worth examining for the serious constitutional questions it poses. This Note ad-

dresses the following question: Even though the Bill seeks to protect
principles of federalism from an overreaching federal government,
would Congress itself exceed its power by keeping too much control
over judicial interpretation and executive enforcement?

The Bill is aimed at rectifying the problem of increasing federal
regulation of state law, as apparent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority.4 The Bill's supporters also seek to expand
the decision in United States v. Lopez5 by further curtailing federal

regulation of private activity that displaces state and local law. The
goal is admirable-to restore meaning to the Tenth Amendment
guarantees 6 given to the states. 7 The Bill proposes "[t]o return power

to State and local governments which are close to and more sensitive
to the needs of the people" 8 by directing Congress, the judiciary, and
executive agencies on how to construe federal statutes.

Part II examines whether section 6 of the Bill usurps the judicial
function by comparing the Bill to the Religious Freedom Restoration

local autonomy from the federal government Thus, the Order substantially
weakened traditional federalism principles by legitimizing broad power for
federal agencies.
3. S. 2250, 105th Cong. (1998). The Bill is one in a series of bills introduced in response to EO 13,083. See id.
4. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that the federal government could directly
regulate the wages and hours of state employees, thus diluting the state's
power to do so).
5. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating a federal law that criminalized the
possession of a firearm in a school zone, thus rejecting federal regulation of
private activity within the state).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.").

7. See 144 CONG. REc. S7280 (daily ed. June 26, 1998) (statement of Sen.

Coverdell).
8. Id. (daily ed. June 26, 1998) (statement of Sen. Coverdell).
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Act of 1993 (the Act, or RFRA), 9 an act that the Court struck down
0 In contrast to RFRA, the Bill is a perin City of Boerne v. Flores.1
missible use of Congress's remedial power because it has sufficient
indicia of contemporary legislative findings and is sufficiently tailored. Congress is merely reshaping its own lawmaking power in order to protect its interests rather than attempting to override the
Court's approach to the Supremacy Clause and federal preemption.
Thus, in this section of the Bill, Congress is not actually telling the
Court how to interpret the laws and is acting within the boundaries of
its power.
Part III examines section 5 of the Bill, which is directed to executive agencies. In section 5, Congress is unconstitutionally telling
the executive branch how to execute the laws and thus is acting contrary to fundamental notions of the separation of powers doctrine.
This part of the Bill results in a merger of the legislative and executive branches and usurpation by the legislature of executive authority. This section of the Bill would not withstand a constitutional attack.
Finally, Part IV concludes that, while the Bill can stand as to the
section regarding judicial interpretation of federal preemption, section 5 must be severed because it unconstitutionally directs executive
agencies on how to perform their tasks. A revised Bill, even without
section 5, would still give strength to federalism by confirming the
principles established by the Tenth Amendment and by providing
protection to the states-and thus the liberty of the people-against
an overreaching federal government.
II. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 6: CONGRESS AND JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION

A. The Court as FinalArbiter
The legislative, executive, and judicial branches derive their
powers from Articles I, II, and III of the United States Constitution,
respectively." Article I, Section 8 sets out Congress's enumerated
9. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb(b) (1994).
10. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
11. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, H,111.
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powers, which include the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
[enumerated and unenumerated] Powers ....
,,12 Generally, the executive veto' 3 and judicial review 14 act as checks on Congress's
power. Although the Constitution is silent regarding the judicial
power to interpret the laws, Marbury v. Madison 5 further defined the
role of judges by establishing judicial supremacy, the final power of
the judiciary to determine what the Constitution and federal statutes
mean. 16
Thus, judicial review was established by case law and is not
found in the text of the Constitution. The doctrine allows the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to decide the constitutionality
of a case or controversy that stems from acts of the legislative and
executive branches.' 7 Judicial review does not preclude the legislative or executive branches from construing the Constitution itself;
rather, it gives the judiciary the final say as to what is or is not constitutional.' 8 In reviewing executive acts, the Court generally defers
to agency interpretation of federal statutes as 9long as that view is reasonable with respect to congressional intent.'
Judicial review gives the Court considerable power because the
Court acts as the final arbiter of what the law is. However, Congress
can limit judicial review by manipulating the appellate jurisdiction of
the Cour&° and by decreasing the number of, or abolishing, lower
federal courts. 2 ' Yet Congress's power to limit judicial review is not
absolute. The first limitation on Congress's power is structural. If
Congress disagrees with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the

12. Id. art. I, § 8,cl. 18.
13. See id. § 7, cl. 2.
14. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
15. Id.
16. See id. at 177-78.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984).
20. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2.
21. See id. art.I, § 8,cl. 9.
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Constitution, Congress cannot dictate how to decide a case or overturn the Court's decision.22 Congress's remedy is to seek to amend
the Constitution through the legislative process. 23 The second limi-

tation on Congress's power is that Congress's purpose must 24be legitimate and constitutional in order to survive judicial scrutiny.
Applying these principles, does section 6 of the Bill unconstitutionally interfere with judicial power to interpret the laws by directing the Court on how to do its job? 25 Although it tells the courts how

to construe federal statutes, section 6 is constitutional. When introducing the Bill in the Senate, Senator Coverdell explained section
6 as "direct[ing] the courts to strictly construe Federal laws and

22. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (holding that it is "the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is"); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (striking down Congress's attempt to
command federal courts to reopen final judgments); United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) (holding that Congress cannot tell the Court
how to decide a case or controversy in pending matters).
23. See U.S. CONST.art. V; see also City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
532 (1997) (strildng down Congress's attempt to make a substantive change in
constitutional protections).
24. See, e.g., Klein, 80 U.S. at 128 (striking down a law whose purpose was
to deny presidential pardons and which foreclosed all federal courts from reviewing the act); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
(striking down a state law imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States as
unconstitutional). But cf Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868)
(upholding a statute that insulated specific laws fromjudicial review because a
federal forum was still available).
25. Senate Bill 2250 states in part:
(a) IN GENERAL.-No statute enacted after the date of enactment of this Act (or rule promulgated under such statute), shall be
construed by courts or other adjudicative entities to preempt, in whole
or in part, any State or local government law, ordinance or regulation
unless-(1) the statute, or rule promulgated under such statute, contains an explicit declaration of intent to preempt; or (2) there is a direct
conflict between such statute and a State or local government law, ordinance, or regulation, such that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together.
(b) FAVORABLE CONSTRUCTION.-Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, any ambiguities in this Act, or in any other law
of the United States, shall be construed in favor of preserving the
authority of the States and the people.
S.2250, 105th Cong. § 6 (1998).
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regulations interfering with State powers... [and requiring] a presumption in favor of State authority and against Federal preemption."'26 Section 6, in essence, provides that state law is to trump federal law in all but two situations: (1) where the federal statute states
explicitly that it intends to preempt state law; or (2) where there is a
direct conflict between state and federal law. 7
Here, Congress is not defining the Tenth Amendment, which it
cannot do. Rather, Congress allows the Court to still have the final
say as to the meaning of the Amendment. Even though congressional intent to defer to state law is clear, Congress merely tells the
Court to give deference to state law. Congress does not direct the
Court on itsfinal decision about the law.
B. CongressDoes Not Have Substantive Power
Congress has the power to enact the Bill under Article I, Section
8, Clause 18 of the United States Constitution, also known as the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress can use its necessary and
proper power to remedy what it sees as unwarranted federal intrusion
on states' rights. 28 Even though Congress has the power to reach out
and remedy constitutional violations, congressional enforcement
power is limited. 29 The "powers of the legislature are defined, and
limited" and do not include congressional power to enact a substantive change-as opposed to a remedial change-in what the law is,
which is a power reserved for the judiciary.30 The line between remedial and substantive change can be a fine distinction. Legislation
is more likely remedial if the evil to be remedied is congruent and
proportional to the means adopted, and is supported by evidence in
the legislative record.3 The rationale for not giving Congress the
power to have the final say in interpreting the laws is to prevent
Congress from defining its own powers and thereby changing the
32
meaning of the Constitution on a whim.
26. 144 CONG. REc. S7280 (daily ed. June 26, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Coverdell).

27. See S. 2250, 105th Cong. § 6 (1998).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
29. See Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976).
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
31. See City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20, 530-33 (1997).

32. See id. at 518-19, 529; see also Marbury,5 U.S. at 177.
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In the Voting Rights Cases,33 the Court upheld certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because the provisions were
"remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most
flagrant,, 3 4 and necessary to "banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our
country for nearly a century., 35 Because the Court found evidence in
the legislative record showing discriminatory application of literacy
tests that excluded certain groups from voting, 36 the Court ultimately
deemed the Act a necessary use of Congress's remedial power to
help cure discrimination in voting.37
Similarly, the Bill seems to address the problem of increasing
federal power over state law and seeks to remedy the problem by enforcing the Tenth Amendment guarantees. The Bill has four main
purposes:
to protect the rights of the States and the people from abuse
by the Federal Government, to strengthen the partnership
and the intergovernmental relationship between State and
Federal Governments, to restrain Federal agencies from exceeding their authority, [and] to enforce the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution .... 38

33. See generally City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 161 (1980)
(upholding a seven-year extension of a requirement of preclearance by the Attorney General or district court of any change in a "'standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting"'); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding a five-year nationwide ban on literacy tests and similar voting
requirements for registering to vote); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966) (upholding a ban on literacy tests that prohibited certain people educated in Puerto Rico from voting); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966) (upholding a suspension of literacy tests and similar voting requirements that combatted racial discrimination in voting).
34. South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at315.
35. Id. at308.
36. See id. at333-34.
37. See id. at 313-15.
38. 144 CoNG. REC. S7280 (daily ed. June 26, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Coverdell).
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Thus, the Bill seeks to address Congress's concern about federal
regulation of the states, including federal laws that displace state and
local laws by regulating private individuals.39
C. Other Triggers: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority 4° and United States v. Lopez41
With the Bill, Congress attempts to revitalize federalism through
the legislative process. In particular, the Bill addresses Congress's
concern with federal regulation of the states4 2 and, to a lesser extent,
federal regulation of private activity that displaces state and local
laws. 43 One cause for the demise of federalism results in part from
"doctrinal developments in constitutional law that have largely freed
the national
government of the constraints inherent in its enumerated
' 4
powers. "
To better understand the context in which the Supreme Court
decided Garcia and Lopez, one should examine the background of
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. In 1976, the Court in National
League of Cities v. Usery45 resurrected the Tenth Amendment from a
truism46 to an affirmative limit on congressional power. In National

League, the Court held that Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to regulate certain applications of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees engaged in "traditional government

functions." 47 The Court made clear, however, that it was not limiting
congressional power over private activity affecting interstate commerce. 48 Rather, regulating the "States qua States" is not allowed if

39. See supra Part MI.E for a detailed examination of why the Bill resembles
a remedial measure, as in the Voting Rights Cases, and not a substantive measure.

40. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

41. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
42. The Bill addresses Congress's concerns after Garcia.
43. The Bill addresses Congress's concerns afterLopez.
44. Hearingon EO 13,083, supra note 2, at 265.
45. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968)).
46. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (stating that "all
is retained which has not been surrendered").
47. NationalLeague,426 U.S. at 833.
48. See id.
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it interferes with federalism principles. 49 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist remarked:
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of
sovereignty attaching to every state government which may
not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may
lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the
matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner. 50
Thus, NationalLeague resurrected the Tenth Amendment protections
of the states.
However, in the 1985 Garciadecision, the Court drastically undercut its decision in National League and diluted the states' Tenth
Amendment protections. The Garcia Court held that the federal
government could directly regulate the wages and hours of state employees. 5 ' The Court reasoned that because Congress consisted of
state-elected representatives, the states' interests were protected
through the political process.52 The majority believed that the states'
participation in the political process would sufficiently "ensure[] that
laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated., 5 3 Thus,
repudiating Marbury, the Garcia Court reasoned that it was up to
Congress, not the 5 judiciary,
to decide the extent of states' Tenth
4
Amendment rights.
In 1995, the Lopez Court changed its course in favor of protecting the states and limited congressional power over them.55 The Lopez Court invalidated a federal law that criminalized the possession
of a firearm in a school zone.5 6 The supporters of this Bill would
agree with the Lopez Court's rejection of federal regulation of private
activity that displaces state and local regulations; however, Lopez is
only a starting point. Whereas Lopez was limited to non-commercial
activities, the Bill gives greater protection to the states by extending
Lopez to all state activities.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 847.
Id.
See Garcia,469 U.S. at 555-56.
See id. at 550-54.
Id. at 556.
See id. at 546-47.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 556.
See id. at 551.
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D. Comparison to RFRA
The Court's decision in City ofBoerne v. Flores57 sheds light on
the possible outcome of a constitutional attack on the Bill if enacted.
In Boerne, the Court struck down RFRA as being beyond Congress's
lawmaking power.58 Congress enacted RFRA in response to the
Court's decision in Employment Division,Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 59 In Smith, the Court applied rational
basis review and upheld an Oregon law that prohibited peyote use
and denied unemployment benefits to persons fired for sacramental
peyote use.60 The Court upheld the law because it was not aimed at
regulating religious beliefs; rather, the law was a generally applicable
criminal drug law. 61 Because of the law's general applicability, the
Court held that its incidental burden on religious practices was constitutional.62
After the Smith decision, Congress enacted RFRA to provide a
statutory cause of action or defense to any party whose free exercise
of religion had been substantially burdened.63 In addition, RFRA
rejected the highly deferential rational basis review used in Smith and
instead required the government to show that the burden furthered a
compelling interest and was the least restrictive alternative. 64 RFRA
applied both prospectively and retroactively to all local, state, and
federal laws.65
At issue in Boerne was whether Congress had authority to enact
RFRA.66 Congress enacted RFRA under its Fourteenth Amendment
Section 5 enforcement power.67 Section 5 of the Amendment is "a
positive grant of legislative power ' 68 and allows Congress "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth
57. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
58. See id. at 511, 536.
59. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
60. See id. at 874, 890.
61. See id. at 884-86.
62. See id. at 872, 885-86, 876-82.
63. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb(b) (1994).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511, 517.
67. See id. at 507.
68. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
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Amendment]. 69 Because the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause was made applicable against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress can enact legislation under Section 5 to en70
Simiforce the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.
lar to its Article I necessary and proper power, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress cannot enact substantive-as opposed to remedial or preventative-measures that change the constitutional
right at hand.7 '
The specific issue in Boerne was whether RFRA was an appropriate use of legislative power to remedy a state's curtailment of a
person's liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. RFRA, in
effect, was a substantive change to the constitutional right to free exercise of religion and therefore an unconstitutional use of Congress's
Section 5 power. RFRA was fatally flawed because it lacked both
sufficient legislative findings and proportionality, two essential ingredients for an act of Congress to be constitutional. 2
First, the act at hand must be appropriate in light of the evil presented and must be supported by the legislative record.73 The record
for RFRA contained no evidence of any generally applicable laws
that Congress passed out of hostility against the free exercise of religion within the past forty years. 74 Rather, the legislative findings
focused on generally applicable laws that had only an incidental burden on religion. 75 Thus, the Court found little evidence of laws targeting religion and determined that "Congress'[s] concern was with

69. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
states in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
70. See id. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish").
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
71. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966).
72. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-33.
73. See id. at 530; see also South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308,
309.
74. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531.
75. See id.
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burdens imposed, not the object or purpose of the legthe incidental
76
islation.,

Second, RFRA was substantive rather than remedial legislation
because it was disproportionate. The Act was "so out of proportion
to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it [could not] be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
behavior.",77 Under RFRA, strict scrutiny would be triggered for
generally applicable laws that incidentally burdened religion, most of
which would otherwise be constitutional.78 The Court distinguished
RFRA from other measures that it upheld under Congress's enforcement power,79 and noted that RFRA intruded at all levels of
government, prohibited official actions regardless of subject matter,
applied to government agencies and officials from the federal level to
the local level, 80 applied retrospectively and prospectively to all federal and state laws, 8 1 had no termination date or mechanism, and

gave a cause of action to all individuals who claimed a substantial
burden on their free exercise of religion. 82 The Court believed
RFRA imposed too strict a test for a virtually unsubstantiated burden.
Thus, the Court struck down RFRA because it was disproportionate and lacked legislative findings of modem instances of laws
targeting religious practices. The Court rejected Congress's attempt
The probto determine what constituted a constitutional violation.Y
84
function.
judicial
a
of
usurpation
lem was congressional

76. Id.
77. Id. at 532.
78. See id. at 532-34.
79. See id. at 532-33 (distinguishing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. at 315-where the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act, which confined
its provisions to the areas of the country where voting discrimination was the
most prevalent and contained a termination clause-and Morgan, 384 U.S. at
643-45, which targeted a voting qualification made on racial grounds).
80. See id. at 532; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(l).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a).
82. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
83. See id. at 535-36.
84. See id. at 536.
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E. Are There ParallelsBetween the Bill andRFRA?
Just as the Court's decision in Smith triggered RFRA, the
Court's decision in Garcia helped trigger the Bill. Because Garcia
holds that Congress is the sole judge of the boundaries of its commerce power, Congress may utilize the Bill to impose guidelines and
limitations upon itself.85 Such limits on its powers include declaring
its intent to preempt state law and specifically citing constitutional
authority to do so. 86 The Bill further extends Congress's efforts to
restore federalism by also requiring that federal agencies not interfere with state or local powers without constitutional authority cited
by Congress. 87 Finally, the Bill directs the courts on how to construe
federal statutes that interfere with state authority and requires a presumption in favor of state power.88 However, unlike RFRA, the Bill
as a whole seems to operate as a valid exercise of congressional
power in response to the erosion of states' Tenth Amendment protections.
While Congress does not use its Fourteenth Amendment Section
5 enforcement power in the Bill as it did with RFRA, it does use its
parallel Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 "necessary and proper" 89
power. Section 5 enables Congress "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]," 90 whereas
Section 8 gives Congress a more general power "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."9 ' Thus, Congress's source of power stems from the
parallel enforcement and necessary and proper clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment and in Article I.

85. See Hearingon EO 13,083, supra note 2, at 266.
86. See 144 CONG. REC. S7280 (daily ed. June 26, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Coverdel).
87. See id. (daily ed. June 26, 1998) (statement of Sen. Coverdell).
88. See id. (daily ed. June 26, 1998) (statement of Sen. Coverdell).

89. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
90. Id. amend. XIV, § 5.
91. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
539, 618-19 (1842) (stating that Congress, through its necessary and proper
power, has the "means to carry into effect rights expressly given. .. ").
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As distinguished from RFRA, section 6 of the Bill is drafted
around RFRA's fatal flaws. As shown in the record, section 6 seems
much more proportional to the remedial object--Ahat of curtailing
abuse of federal power under the Tenth Amendment-which, if allowed, would result in unconstitutional behavior. The Bill looks
more akin to the statute at issue in the Voting Rights Cases, where
the Court determined that the remedies were properly aimed at the
evil. Here, the evil-as Congress perceives it-is a violation of
states' rights by the federal92 government by weakening the guarantees
of the Tenth Amendment.
Senator Coverdell's introduction of the Bill and the hearing record for EO 13,083 lend support for a remedy of this type. Senator
Coverdell stated:
The Tenth Amendment was a promise to the States and to
the American people that the Federal Government would be
limited, and that the people of the States could, for the most
part, govern themselves as they saw fit. Unfortunately,...
that promise has been broken. The American people have
asked us to start honoring that promise again: To return
power to State and local governments which93 are close to
and more sensitive to the needs of the people.
Because the Bill is part of a series of bills introduced in response to
EO 13,083, the hearing transcript of EO 13,083 is also indicative of
the evil that Congress sought to address. Senator David M. McIntosh, chairperson of the subcommittee, noted that "the new order
would wreak havoc on the balance of power envisioned by the Constitution between the States and the Federal Government. 94 The
Senator firther questioned why the President "stripped the most basic protection accorded the States, the preparation of a federalism
assessment for all regulatory and legislative proposals ... ."95 Similar to the record of actual constitutional violations in the Voting
Rights Cases, the record here contains examples of how the federal
government has increased its power and has eviscerated the Tenth
92. See 144 CONG. REc. S7280 (daily ed. June 26, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Coverdell).
93. Id. (daily ed. June 26, 1998) (statement of Sen. Coverdell).
94. Hearingon EO 13,083, supra note 2, at 5 (statement of Sen. McIntosh).
95. Id. (statement of Sen. McIntosh).
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Amendment guarantees to the states. Thus, even though the Order
has been rescinded, the Bill would protect against future attacks on
the Tenth Amendment, as well as remedy the problem of potentially
excessive federal regulation over state and private activity.
The Bill also seems to pass the proportionality prong of Boerne.
Distinguished from RFRA, the Bill is limited to the federal government and, more importantly, addresses an actual evil, that of federal
violation of Tenth Amendment principles. Section 6 of the Bill allows federal law to trump state law in two instances: when the federal statute explicitly states its intent to preempt state law or when
there is a direct conflict between state and federal law. 96 This provision is not an attempt to override the Court's Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. Rather, the provision passes muster because preemption, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, is ultimately an expression of
congressional intent.
Unlike RFRA, section 6 is a limited attempt to remedy the evil
Congress perceives, that of the erosion of state authority by the federal government. Thus, Congress does not mandate total deference
to state law in every situation; rather, it provides exceptions in cases
where the legislature intends to preempt state law. The additional
exemption itself has the underlying purpose of encouraging Congress
to "analyze the source of its power before it acts," one of the themes
noted in the Governmental Affairs Committee hearings on the 1996
proposed bill to enforce the Tenth Amendment. 97 There is no problem with Congress directing itself Here, as in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,98 where the Voting Rights Act was upheld, the Bill affects a discrete group of laws, namely, those that affect an area reserved for the states by the Tenth Amendment.
At first blush it may appear that Congress is encroaching upon
judicial power to define the law by directing the Court on how to
construe the Tenth Amendment. According to the Bill, if a federal
statute does not directly conflict with state law and Congress does
96. See S. 2250, 105th Cong. §6 (1998).
97. 142 CoNG. REc. S11,724 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Stevens, quoting constitutional lawyer Roger Marzulla's remarks on July 16,
1996 to the Governmental Affairs Committee).
98. 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966) (finding that the challenged provisions were
limited to areas with high voting discrimination and affected a confined group
of state voting laws).
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not declare its intent to preempt state law, arguably the Court would
have no choice but to construe the federal law "in favor of preserving
the authority of the States and the people." 99 However, the Court
still has the power to say what the law is'00 because the Court must
only begin its analysis by construing the law in favor of the states.
The Court still has the authority to make a final decision when federal law trumps.
The Bill does not mandate that the Court find in favor of state
law; it merely says that the Court must give deference to the states.' 0 1
Certainly, Congress's intent is to return power to the states by giving
deference to state law, but Congress carefully maneuvers around the
Boerne problem by allowing the Court a narrow out. Thus, although
Congress declares that deference be given to state law, it has preserved judicial autonomy because the Court can still exercise its established power to interpret the laws. Congress is merely reshaping
its own lawmaking power in order to protect its interests. Section 6
thus appears to be a constitutional use of Congress's remedial power.
III.

ANALYSIS OF SECTION 5: CONGRESS AND EXECUTIVE AGENCIES

A. The Text andMeaning of Section 5 of the Bill

Is section 5 of the Bill as carefully constructed as section 6, so
as to avoid a constitutional problem? Typically, Congress passes
federal laws without preemption language and the agency fills in the
gaps to determine the specific rules of the statute by examining legislative intent or making a reasonable determination.' 0 2 Section 5
makes it more difficult for an executive agency rule to get promulgated because the agency becomes powerless to preempt the state
rule unless Congress expressly authorizes preemption.'0 3 This section removes all discretion from executive agencies:
99. S. 2250 § 6(b).

100. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law

is.").

101. See S. 2250 § 6(b).
102. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
103. See S. 2250 § 5(a).
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No agency shall construe any statutory authorization to issue rules as authorizing preemption of State law or local ordinance by rulemaking or other agency action unless-(l)
the statute expressly authorizes issuance of preemptive
rules; and (2) the agency concludes that the exercise of
State power directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal
power under the Federal statute, such that the State statutes
and the Federal rule promulgated under the Federal
10 4statute
together.
stand
consistently
or
cannot be reconciled
Hence, only if the statute expressly authorizes preemption can the
agency enforce federal statutes to trump state law. An important
constitutional question is thus raised: By rendering the agency powerless, has Congress overstepped its constitutional power by telling
the executive agencies--essentially, the President--how to use executive power?
B. CongressionalPower
As noted earlier, Congress has the power to enact the Bill under
its necessary and proper power. 10 5 A strict textual reading of
"proper," "for carrying into Execution," and "vested by this Constitution" indicates that, when Congress uses its necessary and proper
power, it must act within the basic trinity, must identify an independent grant of power that it is executing, and must limit itself to carrying into execution that enumerated power.'0 6 The power merely allows Congress to assure that the branches of government have the
tools necessary to effectively utilize and implement their powers; "it
surely does not license Congress to wrest the power to administer
104. Id. The amendment goes on to describe that the preemption must be
"narrowly written!' and must "explicitly describe" the scope of preemption. Id.
Further, it describes numerous procedural agency rules regarding notice and
opportunity to be heard for state officials and legislators, and a publication plan
for a review of agency rules that preempt state law. See id.
105. See U.S. CoNsT. art. T,§8, cl. 1, 18 ("The Congress shall have Power..
[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof").
106. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrisbna B. Prakash, The President's
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 587-89 (1994).
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federal law away from the President.' 0 7 Because the Constitution
does not explicitly authorize the execution of federal law independent of the President, Congress does not possess power to do so.1 8
Rather, Congress has the power to pass laws that help the other
branches implement their respective powers. 109
The necessary and proper power is about the means, not the
ends." 0 Thus, while Congress can pass laws in aid of implementation, "it does not have the power to enact laws telling the other
branches 'how they ought to carry into execution' one of their powers.""' In other words, although Congress can create an agency to
help the President use his or her executive power, Congress cannot
dictate how the laws will be implemented!" 2 If Congress passes a
statute creating a regulatory scheme, it is the President who decides
how best to execute the law.' '1 The President, and only the President, is constitutionally responsible for deciding how to implement
the laws.
C. The ConstitutionalFramework
Executive agencies occupy a unique position within the separation of powers structure because agencies exercise not only executive4
duties, but also quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions,"1
107. Id. at 623, 635.
108. See id. at 589 (citing Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the
ChiefAdministrator: The Framersand the President'sAdministrative Powers,

102 YALE L.J. 991, 1011 (1993)).
109. See id. at 589-90.
110. Seeid. at590.
111. Id. at591.
112. See id. But see Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President
and the Administration, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 69 (1994) (arguing that Congress has the power to determine how the federal powers will be executed).
113. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of
ConstitutionalInterpretation,81 IowA L. REv. 1267, 1286 (1996).
114. Executive, or administrative, agencies are considered part of the executive branch because that branch has the power of removal. Agencies are quasijudicial because Congress empowers them with adjudicating authority. Agencies are quasi-legislative because Congress empowers them with rule-making
authority. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935):
The [FTC] is an administrative body created by Congress to carry into
effect legislative policies embodied in the statute in accordance with
the legislative standard therein prescribed, and to perform other speci-
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which include interpretation of the law.' 5 Congress cannot control
the administration of the law by passing a statute that tells the executive how to do its job: "It is hard to imagine that a document that
forbids members of Congress from serving as executive officers
would nonetheless allow such members to control indirectly the administration of the laws that they were disabled from
controlling
6
more directly.""
The result, if Congress were allowed to tell the
executive how to do its job, would be a merger of the executive and
legislative branches and a usurpation by the legislature of executive
authority.
Because agencies derive their power from the President, it is
helpful to examine the source and extent of the President's power to
8
execute the law." 7 In the ongoing "unitary executive" debate,"
Professor Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash have persuasively
argued that the President is "constitutionally empowered to administer all federal laws."" 9 This exclusive authority includes the power
to "enforce, administer, and implement federal laws."'120 Professor
Calabresi and Mr. Prakash make their constitutional
case based on a
2'
Constitution.1
the
of
analysis
historical
textual and
The Constitution creates a trinity of powers 2 2 in the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches, which are established by Articles I,
fled duties as a legislative or as a judicial aid ....In administering the
provisions of the statute[,] ... that is to say in filling in and administering the details embodied by that general standard[,] the commission
acts in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.

115. See PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 423 (1996).
116. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 106, at 582-83 (referring to U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2).
117. Even if one rejects this unitary executive view and instead adopts the
view of agency independence, the agencies remain part of the executive
branch; thus, this Note analyzes the agencies as such.
118. The unitary executive debate focuses on whether the Constitution creates a "unitary" Executive with the President at the top of the executive hierarchy, or instead allows Congress to structure the executive branch with independent entities designed to administer the laws. See Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 106, at 582-83.
119. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 106, at 550. See generally U.S.
CONST. art II.
120. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 106, at 589.
121. See id. at 599.
122. See id. at 663.
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II, and III, respectively. 23 This trinity has historical roots stemming
from eighteenth century political theorists, early state constitutions,
and the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation. 124 The Framers were concerned about tyranny resulting from a porous system
lacking a distinct separation among the branches. 25 For example,
the French statesman, Montesquieu, was greatly admired for his
26
principles of free government and of greater separation of powers.
He warned against a single legislative and executive branch in order
to protect liberty and avoid governmental tyranny: "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, ... there
can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a
tyrannical manner."' 27 At the time the Framers drafted the federal
Constitution, state constitutions also divided power into three 28departments and mandated that the powers be separate and distinct.'
The Framers wanted to create an executive strong enough to
counteract an overreaching legislature and to keep balance between
the branches.129 In The Federalist,Madison expounded the virtues
of separation of powers and attempted to convince the future ratifiers
that the Constitution incorporated this principle. 30 The Constitution
thus divided executive from legislative power for the purpose of
guarding against tyranny, and included an executive strong enough to
13
counteract a strong legislature.

123. See U.S. CONST. arts. ,11, H.
124. See Calabresi & Prakash, supranote 106, at 605-26.
125. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 347 (James Madison) (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) ("[A] mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient guard against
those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers
of government in the same hands.").
126. See id. at 5 (editor's introduction).
127. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 151-52 (Thomas

Nugent trans., Hafner Press 1949) (1751).
128. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 106, at 607 (quoting VA. CONST.
of 1776, reprintedin 10 SouRcEs AND DOcuMENTs OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONS
51 (William.F. Swindler ed., 1979)).
129. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 123, 138 (1994).
130. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 60 (editor's introduction).
131. See Greene, supra note 129, at 148; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47,
at 336 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) ("The accumu-
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D. Separationof Powers
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three
general departments of government entirely free from the
control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of
the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question ....The sound application of a principle that
makes one master in his own house precludes him from imposing his control in the house of another who is master
there.'
The Supreme Court, consistent with the separation of powers
doctrine, has struck down a number of laws in which Congress has
impaired or sought to assume a function that the Constitution assigned to another branch.' 3 3 One of the ways Congress intrudes on
another branch is by telling that branch how to do its job. Although
Congress may have created the executive agency that it attempts to
power to
direct, it cannot intrude upon the executive branch's central134
powers.
of
separation
violating
without
administer the laws
In INS v. Chadha,135 the Court invalidated the legislative veto.
The veto, which allowed either house of Congress to reject an
agency's decision without presenting the rejection to the President,
was held inconsistent with the bicameralism and presentment process
of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. 136 Allowing Congress to
intrude on executive power by negating the President's constitutionally given veto power violates separation of powers.' 37 The theory
lation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands...

may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.");

THE FEDERALIST

No. 48, at 343 (James Madison) (describing an executive strong enough to
combat a legislature which was "everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex").
132. Humphrey's Ex'rv. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).
133. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-41 (1976) (per curiam)
(holding sections of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 violative of
separation of powers where Congress assigned enforcement powers to the Federal Elections Commission).
134. See, e.g., id. at 138-39 (stating that Congress may undoubtedly create
"offices" under the necessary and proper clause, but is inevitably bound by the
express language of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
135. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
136. See id. at 951-59; see also U.S. CONST.art. I, §7.
137. See Chadha,462 U.S. at 955.
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behind the Court's decision in Chadha is that, "although Congress
may delegate legislative power to administrative agencies, it may not
delegate such power back to itself.'' 138 Even though Justice Powell,

in his concurrence, characterized the legislative veto as an improper
use of congressional power through adjudication, one can draw a
parallel to the improper use of congressional execution of power as
well. 139 In essence, Congress can regulate executive power by creating agencies to help the President carry out his or her duties, by
limiting agency funding, or by curtailing its personnel or jurisdiction.' 40 However, Congress cannot tell another branch how to do its
business.
E. Is Section 5 of the Bill Consistentwith the Constitution and Case
Law?
Keeping the constitutional framework and established case law
in mind, has Congress abused its power by telling executive agencies
how to administer the law? First, let us take a closer look at the main
points of section 5 of the Bill. Under section 5(a), if Congress does
not explicitly authorize federal preemption of state law, and the state
and federal rules directly conflict and cannot stand together, then an
agency is powerless to preempt state law.141 Thus, the executive

agency can no longer preempt state law unless Congress explicitly
authorizes it on a statute-by-statute basis. The remainder of section 5
lays out various procedural rules.142
138. Greene, supra note 129, at 165; see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954-55
(finding that once Congress delegated its deportation authority to the Attorney
General, Congress was bound to abide by the Attorney General's decisions
until the delegation is altered or revoked).
139. See Greene, supra note 129, at 163.
140. See id.at 171.
141. See S.2250, 105th Cong. § 5(a) (1998).
142. See id. Within section 5(a), Congress directs itself to write preemption
authorizations narrowly, with an eye toward the objectives of the statute, and
to explicitly lay out the scope of preemption. The section also lays out what
the agency must do once it "finds" that a state law is preempted: (1) provide
the affected state(s) with notice and an opportunity to be heard; (2) provide
notice of the extent and purpose of the preemption to the state governor, attorney general, and presiding officers of each chamber of the state legislature; and
(3) publish a list of preemptive rules in the table of contents of each Federal
Register. Finally, there is a requirement that each agency publish in the Fed-
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Perhaps Congress is trying to keep too much control over executive enforcement of the laws by directing federal agencies on how
to construe federal statutes. Congress can clearly tell itself what to
do, and part of section 5(a) does exactly that. Section 5(a) tells Congress how to make the laws; such authority falls within its Article I,
Section I powers. Promulgating the procedural sections that regulate
executive agency powers are also within Congress's power. Although, in a sense, Congress is telling the agencies how to do their
jobs-provide notice and opportunity to be heard, etc.--Congress is
not intruding upon the agencies' central function, which is to assist
the President in executing the laws. Instead of telling agencies how
to construe federal statutes, the procedural provisions of section 5(a)
constitutionally curtail agency power by mandating faithfulness to
certain procedural requirements. 143
However, constitutional problems arise with what Congress attempts to do in the first part of section 5(a), where it takes away all
agency authority to independently find federal preemption of state
law.'" This part is inconsistent with the separation of powers doctrine. In stating that no federal law preempts unless Congress explicitly says so, Congress reserves for itself the sole power to determine how to construe federal statutes and completely robs executive
agencies of their core executive function of deciding how to carry
out the law.
Arguably, because Congress has the power to create and emthe right to take away whatever power
power federal agencies, it has
it grants to such agencies. 145 Besides, ifagencies look to congressional intent when construing federal statutes, what is wrong with
eral Register a plan for periodic review of rules that preempt, at least in part,
state or local law. See id.
143. See id. (stating that an agency must comply with notice requirements).
144. See id.
145. In numerous areas of constitutional law, the Court has recognized that
the greater power does not include the lesser power. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (holding that a state ordinance regulating an unprotected category of speech was unconstitutional because it was
impermissibly content-based); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970)

(holding that procedural due process requires holding a pretermination evi-

dentary hearing before public assistance payments to welfare recipients are
discontinued, even though public assistance benefits are a "privilege" and not a

"right").
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Congress laying out those situations in which agencies should find
preemption? After all, preemption could be viewed as strong medicine because it displaces what the majority wants and what is established through the state legislative process. Congress's intent behind
the Bill is to protect the states from an overreaching federal
govern46
ment; in essence, to safeguard and maintain federalism.'
This view is problematic because, although the ends are legitimate, the means violate the essence of separation of powers. Congress's intent to protect federalism simply cannot justify congressional intrusion into another branch's duties or a reduction in the
multiple repositories of power among the three branches of the federal government. Further, Chadha demonstrates that, even though
Congress may delegate legislative power to agencies, it may not
delegate such power back to itself.'47 Quite simply, Congress cannot
tell members of the executive branch how to do their jobs.
Section 5 is also inconsistent with current judicial respect for
executive autonomy. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 4 s the Court gave deference to agency interpretation of federal law, thereby respecting executive autonomy. In
Chevron, the Court deferred to the Environmental Protection
Agency's judgment regarding permit requirements because Congress
did not expressly address the issue in the relevant statute or in its
legislative history. 49 In construing a statute, the Court reasoned, the
agency must give effect to an unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.' 50 If the statute is silent or unclear regarding congressional intent, the agency is free to interpret the statute based on a
"permissible construction. ' Thus, as long as the agency's interpretation is reasonable and is one that Congress would have sanctioned, the Court gives deference to the agency's decision. 152 In
other words, Chevron deference is triggered when: (1) Congress has

146. See 144 CoNG. REc. S7280 (daily ed. June 26, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Coverdell).
147. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983).
148. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
149. See id. at 841, 858.
150. See id. at 842-43.

151. Id. at 843.
152. See id. at 844-45.
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not expressly declared its intent in a statute, and (2) when the
agency's interpretation is reasonable.' 53
Although Chevron did not discuss preemption, when a federal
law is passed without preemption language, Chevron deference is
given to agency interpretation if both prongs of Chevron are satisfied. 154 Thus, section 5 attempts to narrow Chevron by taking away
agency interpretation and reserving sole interpretative authority regarding preemption to Congress. Proponents of section 5 may also
assert that the Supremacy Clause' 55 applies only when the national
legislature acts, and thus it follows that only Congress can authorize
preemption. However, Chevron established that "the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ' 5 6 include
reasonable regulations by a federal agency. Thus, agencies have the
power to preempt state law.
Section 5 tightens up preemption laws and drastically narrows
the rule in Chevron. Although agency preemption displaces state
law-and thus the will of the people--through unelected agency
members, allowing Congress to do the agency's job is not the answer. Section 5 ironically exposes the people to the worst form of
governmental tyranny: It collapses the executive and legislative
branches into one and diminishes the safety mechanism of a balance
of power through separation of powers.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Bill is a proper use of Congress's remedial power; however,
section 5 must be severed if the Bill is to survive a constitutional attack. As the Bill stands, section 5 is problematic because Congress
directs the executive branch on how to do its job and thus merges the
legislative and executive branches into one. The result is a violation
153. See id.at 845.
154. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 1439, 1445 (1999) (holding that the Federal Court of Appeals failed to give deference to the Board of
Immigration Appeals' statutory interpretation regarding an alien's entitlement
to witholding of deportation); see also Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc.
v. Shalala, 119 S. Ct. 930, 934 (1999) (holding that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services's decision was within the bounds of reasonable interpretation
and entitled to deference under Chevron).
155. U.S. CONST. art VI, §2.
156. Id.
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of fundamental notions of separation of powers. The remainder of
the Bill, including section 6, in which Congress directs the judiciary,
could withstand an attack on its constitutionality. Section 6 leaves
open judicial discretion to exercise the Court's established power to
interpret the laws, and thus does not suffer from the separation of
powers problems of section 5.
There may be other ways in which Congress can provide greater
protection to the states. Congress might impose restrictions on the
use of grants to indirectly regulate the states or reform federal court
jurisdiction by limiting diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 157 The
wisdom and constitutionality of these methods are beyond the scope
of this Note. However, by placing safeguards in the legislative process, providing guidance to the federal courts, and drafting a reintroduced Bill in a future Congress that is passed without section 5,
Congress will then make great strides toward its goal of enforcing
the Tenth Amendment, returning power to the states, and protecting
individual liberties.
Allyson T. Oshidari*

157. See Hearing on EO 13,083, supra note 2, at 267, 270 (report of the

Working Group on Federalism of the Domestic Policy Council, Nov. 1986).
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